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1. Introduction  
 
It has traditionally been argued that the development of basic infrastructure in telecommunications 
is dependent on the quality of countries’ institutions in general and on their political institutions in 
particular (Esfahani and Ramírez, 2003; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Levy and Spiller, 1996). The 
reason, which applies for all utilities sectors, is that the existence of political checks and balances 
reduces the probability of hold-up or expropriation of the investment by the government. 
Infrastructure investments are believed to suffer from a number of market imperfections such as the 
economies of scale generated by network externalities, which increase the role of governments 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 1988). In principle, governments should only be interested in regulating 
these externalities but occasionally they may try to redistribute wealth and expropriate investors in 
order to obtain political credit. In the case of telecommunications, an opportunistic government 
might ex-post expropriate the heavy capital investment in infrastructure and guarantee at least a 
temporarily cheap service to its citizens, an action that would arguably result in some internal 
political credit. The chance of this happening can be evaluated by looking at investor surveys and 
indicators such as the International Country Risk Guide or structurally-derived indices of the local 
polity such as the POLCON index proposed by Henisz (2000). In order to avoid the risk of 
expropriation, investors are advised to avoid the poor institutional settings that are typical of many 
developing countries, even when local market conditions advise otherwise (Henisz and Zelner, 
2001: 132). We argue that both investors and developing nations can do better if appropriate 
technologies are available.  
 
We study the evolution of three information and communication technologies in 183 countries for 
the period 1990-2004 and show that telecommunications dependence on superior political 
institutions is greatly reduced in the case of cellular telephony. From an institutional perspective, 
cellular telephony has two advantages when compared to communications technologies that rely 
heavily on fixed-line infrastructure. First, cellular networks are built faster than fixed-line networks; 
they are cheaper and need fewer subscribers to reach a minimally efficient scale. Second, the assets 
on which cellular telephony relies are re-deployable and less site-specific. In essence, in the case of 
telecommunications, lower capital requirements and higher asset mobility arguably compensate for 
poor political institutions. Thus, evaluation of the importance of institutions for different 
technologies rather than for the industry of telecommunications as a whole may reveal important 
growth opportunities for developing countries.    
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Our results are relevant for academics, policymakers and investors alike. Interest in the study of 
institutions, including political institutions, has triggered an enormous amount of literature with 
surprisingly few practical implications beside the fact that institutions matter. In this paper, we offer 
some actionable knowledge when considerable improvements in political institutions are unlikely. 
We study the relationship between the diffusion of three telecommunications technologies and 
political institutions across 183 countries during the period 1990-2004. We argue that, by picking 
the technology that fits into their institutional environment, policymakers and investors can do one 
of the things within their powers to foster technological adoption and the consequent economic 
development. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first panel-data study that looks at the 
potential of different technologies, among the available alternatives, according to countries’ 
political institutions.1 Empirically, our contribution is threefold: first, we evaluate the impact of 
political institutions at technology rather than at industry level; second, we include many more 
countries than previous studies on related issues have done (notably Henisz and Zelner, 2001); and 
third, by using a GMM variant of the Arellano and Bond (2001) estimator, we effectively deal with 
endogeneity, which is frequently poorly managed in studies using institutional variables.  
 
This article begins with a brief overview of the role of telecommunications technologies for 
economic growth. Then we describe how fixed telephony, cellular telephony and Internet 
connectivity differ in the requirements they make on the institutional environment. We hypothesize 
that technologies built on cheap, re-deployable modules require fewer institutional guarantees in 
order to expand than more expensive technologies built on site-specific assets. Next, we present the 
econometric analysis of the panel showing that in the case of telecommunications, the dissemination 
of cellular technology is less dependent on political institutions than others. Finally, we discuss the 
prospects for economic growth in the light of the existing evidence and offer some policy 
recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Andonova (2006) empirically investigates the determinants of Internet and cellular phone penetration levels  
in a cross-country setting taking into account a number of institutional variables .in a cross-country setting 
taking into account a number of institutional variables.  
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2. Telecommunications and development  
 
It has long been argued that telecommunications spur development and growth (Garbade and Silber, 
1978; DuBoff, 1980; Hardy, 1980; Nathaniel, 1984; Norton, 1992).  As a mechanism for reducing 
information asymmetry, telecommunications are expected to facilitate economically beneficial 
transactions, positively affecting a series of indicators, among them productivity and economic 
growth. Empirically, these relations had been hard to demonstrate and for many years economists 
considered there was a “productivity paradox” in their failed attempts to find a positive relationship 
between investments in information technology and productivity (Berndt and Morrison, 1995). 
Eventually a complex relationship characterized by time lags and non-linearities was confirmed 
(Bassu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan, 2003; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1996, 2000; Dunne, Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Troske, 1999). On firm level, telecommunications are believed to allow for more 
flexible and geographically disperse organizations that benefit from regional comparative 
advantages (Wellenius, 1977; Yilmaz, Haynes and Dinc, 2002). Thus, telecommunications 
investment has been treated as a growing source of productivity gains for firms that have to deal 
with the increasingly information-intensive nature of production (Warf, 1995) and those that 
actively use outsourcing and multiple locations. At the same time, investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure is found to exhibit negative spillover effects, becoming a 
competitive tool for attracting factors of production (Yilmaz et al., 2002). 
 
In addition, many of the studies that establish a relationship between infrastructure, including 
telecommunications, and economic growth (Aschauer, 1989a,b; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; 
Canning, Fay, Perotti, 1994; Sanchez-Robles, 1998) have become controversial, mainly because of 
unaddressed endogeneity and the direction of causality. After taking into account these criticisms, 
Esfahani and Ramírez (2002) perform a careful estimation of the effects between infrastructure, 
including telecommunications, and GDP and report that the impact of infrastructure on GDP growth 
“turns out to be substantial” (p. 470). The effect of telecommunications on indicators like 
productivity and economic growth seems, eventually, to have been carefully proven. However, the 
economic relevance of this result has recently been questioned by Roller and Waverman (2001) 
who, by simultaneously estimating a micro model for telecommunications investment with a macro 
production function for the OECD countries, find a strong causal relationship between 
telecommunications infrastructure and productivity only when telecommunications services reach 
near universal levels.  
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In general, telecommunications are shown to have a positive effect on different measures of 
economic development and productivity; however, there is some degree of controversy related to 
the empirical robustness, sample size and economic relevance of the effects reported by different 
studies. Assuming that such a positive relation is generally proven, our goal here is to study to what 
extent the degree of political risks affects the diffusion of three different telecommunications 
technologies.  
 
3. Institutions and the diffusion of three communications technologies  
 
It is argued that telecommunications, together with other utilities such as electricity, depend greatly 
on local political institutions because the technology relies on large sunk investments in specific 
assets, is characterized by economies of scale and scope, and the output is massively demanded by 
the general public (Bergara, Henisz and Spiller, 1998). The received wisdom is that such 
characteristics make the contracting process in these industries very politicized and, therefore, 
dependent on the countries’ political institutions. In the case of telecommunications, the above-
mentioned traits are commonly conceived as characteristics of the sector rather than of a specific 
technology. In the past, such an assumption might have been valid for the purpose of simplification. 
Since the massive penetration of cellular telephony and Internet connectivity, however, industry- 
rather than technology-centered studies severely limit our understanding of the role of political 
institutions for the development of telecommunications worldwide. 
 
Today, within the telecommunications industry, there are at least three massively-used means of 
communication: fixed telephony, cellular telephony and Internet. There are important technological 
differences between them related to the size of the investment involved and the specificity of the 
assets on which each of the three relies. For example, cellular networks can be installed more 
rapidly and cheaply than fixed (ITU, 1999, p. 5). Installation is fast because there is no need for new 
wired lines and networks use installed fixed lines for links between cell sites. “Technically, there 
are no lines to lay to the subscriber’s premises; put in a few base stations and a switch and service is 
available for anyone with a handset” (ITU, 1999; pp. 62). Also, if built today, mobile networks are 
much cheaper to deploy than fixed networks (ITU, 1999; pp. 61; 83). In fact, fixed networks have 
stopped growing and are actually declining in many countries, if Integrated Services Digital 
Network (ISDN) lines are not taken into account. ISDN lines add between two and thirty “virtual” 
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connections to an existing fixed line. The reason for the increase in ISDN is the growing demand 
for Internet access that is still dependent on the fixed-line network (ITU, 1999: p. 2-3).  
 
Differences in the value and site-specificity of the assets on which different telecommunication 
technologies rely may pose different requirements on the degree of political commitment that is 
demanded for each of them. We expect the communication technologies that rely heavily on site-
specific assets and require larger up-front investments such as the deployment of basic 
infrastructure2 and the provision of Internet connectivity to show higher dependence on political 
institutions than cellular telephony, which is built on mobile and re-deployable modules. This is 
because technologies relying on expensive site-specific assets are more exposed to possible 
governmental hold-up, so the diffusion of such technologies would depend more on the political 
predictability of host countries. In fact, we predict that countries whose institutional development 
does not provide sufficient political guarantees for investment in Internet connectivity might still be 
sufficiently attractive for investment in cellular telephony, given the mobility and lower cost of its 
assets. 
 
4. The dataset and variables 
 
We study the impact that national political institutions for investment protection have on the 
penetration rate of three different communications technologies: fixed-line telephony, Internet and 
cellular telephony. These three technologies rely on assets with different degrees of value and 
specificity so, if the hold-up hypothesis for infrastructure investment is correct, they would require a 
different degree of political commitment for investor protection.  
 
 
We use economic and demographic data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(2005) and the International Telecommunication Union (2005) databases. The proxy for political 
commitment measured by the level of constraints on executive discretion is taken from the 
                                                 
2 As we emphasize below, the effect of the political institutions on the diffusion of basic infrastructure 
approximated by the number of main lines in operation cannot be fully appreciated given the time span of our 
study, 1990-2004. During this period, fixed-line telephony stopped growing in many countries as they 
achieved near universal adoption while others were close to universal usage. Most previous studies of the 
effect of political institutions on the telecommunications sector focus exclusively on the variable for main 
lines in operations and find a strong and statistically significant coefficient (see, for example, Henisz and 
Zelner (2001), who use the same proxy for political commitment).   
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POLCON 2005 database.3 Our dataset contains information for 214 countries over the period 1980-
2004. However, a number of countries do not report data for the decade 1980-1990 on many of the 
variables we use. Therefore, we restrict the sample to the period 1990-2004 and to 183 countries. 
The reduction in the sample size is traded against the quality of the data and the robustness of the 
estimates.  
 
We use three dependent variables: Main Lines (ML), Internet Hosts (IH) and Cellular Phone 
Subscribers (SPS) are proxies for the development of fixed telephony, Internet connectivity and 
cellular telephony, respectively. Main Lines (ML) are the per capita main telephone lines in 
operation connecting the subscriber’s terminal equipment to a public, switched network having a 
dedicated part in the telephone exchange equipment (ITU, 2005). Internet Hosts (IH) are the per 
capita number of computers in an economy that are directly linked to the worldwide Internet 
network. We choose to use Internet Hosts instead of Internet Users as a proxy for Internet 
penetration for reasons of quality. Internet Users are the per capita estimated number of Internet 
users based on the reports of Internet Access Provider subscriber counts or calculated by 
multiplying the number of Internet hosts by an estimated multiplier. This methodology may 
considerably understate the number of Internet users in developing countries (Chinn and Fairlie, 
2004). Cellular Phone Subscribers (CPS) are the per capita cellular telephone subscribers. This may 
include subscribers to analog and digital cellular systems.  
 
We choose to use POLCON as a proxy for the political commitment for investor protection. 
POLCON is a structurally derived and internationally comparable index that reflects the degree to 
which the national political institutions, together with the preferences of political actors, constrain 
effects on government policy (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). In essence, using political science 
databases, the POLCON index represents a measure of institutional hazards, taking into account the 
number of veto points on a policy change and the homogeneity of preferences of political players. 
This variable ranges from 0 to 1 and is calculated on a yearly basis. It can be interpreted as an 
objective measure of the degree to which investors’ interests are protected by a given polity and it 
has one important advantage to the subjective risk ratings based on managerial surveys like 
                                                 
3 The POLCON variable was initially proposed by Henisz (2000) and it has been periodically updated since 
then.  We chose this variable because it is an objective and conservative measure among the available indices 
of political risks. First, it is a more objective measure of government commitment than, for example, the 
“contract repudiation” indicator available for the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Second, the two 
variables are reported to be highly correlated, with the ICRG’ index showing higher statistical significance 
(Esfahani and Ramírez, 2003) than POLCON in growth regressions.  
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International Country Risk Guide indicators. Subjective ratings are only indirectly related to the 
structure of political institutions while POLCON is a direct measure of it.  In Table 1 we show the 
mean average value of the POLCON variable during the sample period, i.e. 1990-2004. 
 
(Table 1) 
 
We also take into account a number of demand and supply side controls for infrastructure: waiting 
lists for main lines (WL), annual per capita investment in telecommunications (TI), GDP per capita 
(GDP), number of Internet users (IU) and the peak rate of mobile (Price CPS) and fixed-phone 
(Price ML) 3-minute local calls. In Table 2 we show summary statistics on the variables used in the 
analysis. 
  
(Table 2) 
 
5. The econometric model 
 
To empirically test the above-hypothesized relationships, we estimate several reduced-form 
equations for technology adoption rates. The core specification of our model is similar to that in 
Henisz and Zelner (2001). To explain technology adoption, we determine the following linear 
relationship: 
 
, , 1 , ,i t i t i t i ty y Xα β δ ε−Δ = + + +  (1) 
 
where the endogenous variable yi,t can be the logarithm of main lines (ML), Internet hosts (IH) or 
cellular phone subscribers (CPS) for country i at period t; Δ is the difference operator (since the 
variables are in logarithms, it is equivalent to the growth rate); Xit is a matrix containing a set of 
covariates, εit is a normally distributed random error term, and α, β and δ are a set of parameters to 
be estimated. Given that there is substantial heterogeneity, generally unobserved, among countries 
in their telecommunication technology penetration rates, if we decompose the random error term εit, 
model (1) can be expressed as 
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, , 1 , ,i t i t i t i t i ty y X u eα β δ γ−Δ = + + + + +  (2) 
 
captured by including time dummies. Alternatively, a pooled OLS estimate of equation (1) that 
includes time and country dummies would provide the same results as those obtained by the panel 
data fixed-effects model. However, this estimation method will provide inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters involved in equation (2). To overcome this problem, we use a variant of the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM estimator.  
 
The estimation method used here can be described as follows. Consider the following general linear 
relationship with country fixed effects: 
 
, , 1 , ,i t i t i t i i ty y X u eβ δ−= + + +  (3) 
 
The strategy used to estimate equation (3) consists in differencing the equation in order to remove 
the country-specific effect ui 
 
, , 1 , 1 , 2 , , 1 , , 1( ) ( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ty y y y X X e eβ δ− − − − −− = − + − + −  (4) 
 
However, differencing means that even strictly exogenous variables become endogenous, in 
addition to the presence of non-strictly exogenous variables. Therefore, by construction, in equation 
(4) we have the lagged difference of our endogenous variable and it may be that the difference of 
other explanatory variables is correlated with the error term, which in turn creates a severe problem 
of endogeneity. Hence, our core specification will include not only correlated and heteroskedastic 
residuals, but also non-strictly exogenous and endogenous variables as covariates. In this context, a 
fixed-effects model with the Newey-West corrected covariance matrix provides consistent estimates 
of the standard errors in the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
However, the presence of endogenous covariates creates severe identification problems in the 
econometric estimation that in turn lead to inconsistent estimate of model (2).  
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To deal with this problem of endogeneity, we use a variant of the estimation method based on the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) proposed in Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM 
estimator proposed by these authors treats the equation to be estimated as a system of equations, 
one for each period. Hence, the first differences of the endogenous and non-strictly exogenous 
variables are instrumented with lags for the same variables in levels, but imposing the following 
moment conditions: 
 
, , , 1( ) 0; 2; 3i t k i t i tE y e e k t− −⎡ ⎤− = ≥ ≥⎣ ⎦  (5) 
, , , 1( ) 0; 2; 3i t k i t i tE X e e k t− −⎡ ⎤− = ≥ ≥⎣ ⎦  (6) 
 
However, Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002) show that often 
lags for the levels of these variables are poor instruments, and they suggest suitable conditions for 
fixing this problem. One alternative is to instrument endogenous and non-strictly exogenous 
variables with lags of their own first differences, instead of with lags for the variables in levels. The 
GMM variant of the original Arellano and Bond’s estimator used here incorporates these elements. 
In particular, the method we use here has both one- and two-step versions. We have decided to 
adopt the more efficient two-step method although it tends to be downward biased. In other to fix 
this, we apply the finite-sample correction of the two-step covariance matrix proposed in 
Windmeijer (2005).4 
 
In our core model, the matrix Xit contains the following variables, i.e. lagged POLCON, the lagged 
logarithm for GDP, the GDP growth rate between period t and t-1, the lagged logarithm for user 
prices (PRICE), the investment in telecommunications technology (TI) as a percentage of the 
lagged GDP, and the multiplicative interaction between the first lag for POLCON and the first lag 
for the respective technology variable, i.e. main lines (ML), Internet hosts (IH), or cellular phone 
subscribers (CPS). According to this core specification, equation (2) can be expressed as 
 
                                                 
4 See Roodman (2005) for details. 
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, ,
, 1 1 , 1 2 3 1
, 1 , 1
, 1
4 5 , 1 6 , 1 , 1 ,
, 1
log log log log log
( ·log )
i t i t
i t i t t
i t i t
i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t
CT GDP
ML GDP PRICE
CT GDP
TI
POLCON POLCON CT u e
GDP
α β δ δ δ
δ δ δ γ
− − −
− −
−
− − −
−
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
(7) 
 
where the CT is the corresponding communication technology, which is replaced by ML, IH or 
CPS. When estimating the core model expressed in equation (3) for Mail Lines and Internet Hosts, 
we also allow for additional demand controls such as the logarithm of the per capita number of 
people on waiting lists for main lines (WL) and the logarithm of the per capita number of Internet 
users (IU), respectively. 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
In Table 3 we report the results from estimating our core model as specified in equation (3) by both 
the Generalized Method of Moments (column labeled as GMM) and the linear panel- data model 
with fixed effects (column labeled as FE) for our three endogenous variables: Main Lines (ML), 
Cellular Phone Subscribers (CPS) and Internet Hosts (IH). Recall that our core model specifies the 
technology penetration level as a function of the first lag of the same technology penetration level, 
the real gross domestic product lagged one period and in first differences, POLCON lagged one 
period, and the multiplicative interaction between the first lag of the penetration level and 
POLCON.  
 
(Table 3) 
 
Although we provide the results coming from both estimation methods, i.e. fixed-effects and GMM, 
we will focus on the GMM estimates only because of the advantages of this estimation procedure.5 
We start by discussing the effects of the proxy for political institutions (POLCON) on the 
technology variables. As expected, POLCON has turned out to be statistically significant and 
                                                 
5 In model (3), 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,β δ δ δ  and 4ˆδ are elasticities, while 5ˆδ and 6ˆδ  are semi-elasticities. 
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positive. This result is consistent with that observed in earlier studies and indicates that political 
institutions are important for the diffusion of all telecommunications technologies. In addition, we 
find that the effect of the POLCON variable is smaller for CPS than for ML and IH. We consider 
this result to be quite important, since it confirms the main hypothesis we propose in this study, 
namely that the diffusion of cellular technology requires a relatively lower degree of political 
predictability and institutionally-supported investor protection. The semi-elasticities for the variable 
POLCON presented in Table 3 show that an increase of 0.1 in the political constraints score 
increases the penetration rate of cellular telephony (CPS) by around 2 percent. The effects for the 
penetration level of main lines (ML) and Internet hosts (IH) are 3.4 and 17 percent, respectively. 
The relevant comparison is between the coefficients of POLCON for cellular telephony (2 percent) 
and Internet hosts (20 percent), given that fixed telephony (3.4 percent) is very advanced in its life 
cycle for the time period under study. Once we add the first lag of the logarithm of the per capita 
number of people on waiting lists for main lines to the core model, the level of POLCON 
coefficient for ML remains the same. However, in the case of the penetration level of Internet hosts 
(IH), this rises by up to 28 percent once we include a control for the per capita number of Internet 
users (IU).  
 
The interaction variable (yt-1 POLCONt-1) is also statistically significant and negative for main lines 
(ML) and cellular phone subscribers (CPS), implying a positive but decreasing effect of political 
institutions on the diffusion of these technologies. This result suggests that the presence of stronger 
political constraints, i.e. when POLCON tends to 1, may improve the ability of laggard countries to 
increase their telecommunication technologies’ penetration levels, creating a convergence effect. 
This result is expected for main lines. In our sample, we observe that fixed-line telephony 
penetration was quite stable during the period 1990-2004 as many countries achieved, or were close 
to, universal usage, resulting in weak net increases in main line diffusion, with decreases for the 
most advanced countries. The diffusion of cellular telephony, as with fixed telephony, is 
characterized by a positive and decreasing effect of political institutions but for a different reason as 
in our sample this technology is far from reaching universal usage. This effect is consistent with 
plenty of anecdotal evidence showing that cellular telephony is a functional substitute for fixed 
telephony in developing countries where basic telecommunications infrastructure is precarious and 
political risks are high (Davis and Ochieng, 2006).  However, the interaction variable turns out to be 
positive for Internet hosts (IH), indicating that the effect of political institutions on Internet 
connectivity for the period under study is increasing. This implies a divergence in international 
12
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Internet diffusion as measured by the Internet Hosts proxy. Once again we have evidence for the 
differential effect of political institutions on the diffusion of telecommunications technologies. 
 
The first lag of the dependent variable in levels (yi,t-1) turns out to be statistically significant and 
negative, which means that laggard countries experience, ceteris paribus, higher growth rates with 
respect to their existing level of ICT penetration. This effect is substantially larger for the growth 
rate of penetration of IH and CPS, since a one percent increase in the level of IH and CPS reduces 
the growth rate of penetration by around 0.5 and 0.4 percent, respectively. For ML this reduction is 
around 0.11. This shows that there is a negative relationship between past rates of technological 
adoption and penetration growth rates, providing some evidence for catch-up or convergence in 
technological penetration. Naturally, the size of the catch-up effect is smaller for Main Lines (ML) 
given how advanced in its life cycle this technology is for most countries during the period of 
analysis, 1990-2004. 
  
Our core specifications also include the logarithm of the level of the per capita GDP lagged one 
period and its first difference. On the one hand, the GDP level catches up the effect of demand. As 
we observe, the expected effect for this variable is statistically significant and positive which in turn 
indicates, in line with growth theory, that the long-run level of ICT penetration increases with the 
level of demand. This effect is fairly modest for the ML variable. A one percent increase in the 
GDP level causes growth in the ML penetration rate the next period of about 0.1 percent. These 
increments are markedly larger for IH and CPS, around 0.6 and 0.4 percent, respectively. On the 
other hand, the first difference in GDP catches up the speed at which the increase in demand 
conditions growth in technology penetration. In other words, if the gap in the logarithm for GDP 
between t and t-1 is large enough, the GDP level appears not to be a good proxy for the demand 
level. This variable has reported the largest effect for the penetration rate of IH. The fact is that both 
variables, the GDP level and the GDP difference, have reported large effects for the IH variable. 
 
In the extended specification of our core model, in the main lines (ML) equation we include the first 
lag of the logarithm of the per capita number of people on waiting lists for main lines log (WL)t-1  
and its first difference Δlog(WL)t. Similarly, in the IH equation, we include the first lag of the 
logarithm for the per capita number of Internet users log(IU)t-1  and its first difference Δlog(IU)t. We 
find that the respective demand variable exerts a very strong effect on the penetration rate of IH, 
while the effect on the ML variable is quite weak. This result, jointly with the effects of GDP on 
13
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penetration rates, shows that demand for Internet connectivity (measured by Internet Hosts) is very 
much dependent on the economic possibility of acquiring a personal computer and becoming an 
Internet user. Finally, the effect of the first lag of the logarithm of user costs for ML and CPS, and 
the effect of the first lag of the technology investment as a percentage of GDP turn out to be 
statistically significant and with the expected signs. 
 
In Table 3 we also report the Sargan6 test of over-identifying restrictions, which is a test of the 
validity of instrumental variables.7 We find that the validity of the instruments is confirmed for all 
the specifications used. Alternatively, we also show the results of the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation, i.e. AR(1) and AR(2).  We observe that AR(1) structure cannot be rejected in any 
of the estimated models, while the AR(2) structure is rejected for all of them.8 The results of these 
tests indicate that there is no serial correlation between the first-differenced variables used as 
instruments and the first differences of the residuals eit. Hence they are good instruments.9  
 
7. Policy implications and discussion  
 
In this large-scale panel-data study we estimate the effect of political constraints on the diffusion of 
three telecommunications services, showing that institutions have differential effects on three 
technologies in this industry. In essence, for telecommunications over the last fourteen years we 
find that political institutions are important but not as much as was previously believed. The reason 
is that cellular or, to use a more general term, mobile technologies show lower dependence on 
political constraints stemming from their limited exposure to political hold-up. No previous studies 
of which we are aware have shown the time-persistent ability of technological alternatives to lessen 
the hold-up problem and, consequently, the importance of political institutions for infrastructure 
investment.10 Our empirical strategy and in particular the way we deal with endogeneity make our 
                                                 
6 In our results the original statistic of the Sargan test is replaced by the Hansen J statistic, which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. See Roodman (2005) for details. 
7 Under the null hypothesis the statistic follows a chi-square where the degrees of freedom are determined by 
the number of instruments used in the estimation.  
8 The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation.  
9 An AR(1) structure implies that serial autocorrelation is removed after one difference, whereas a higher 
order structure AR(s), with s≥2, means that a first difference is not enough to remove autocorrelation. Given 
that the estimation method used here uses as instruments the first differences, the persistence of this 
correlation after applying a first difference would imply that they are endogenous, and hence bad instruments.   
10 Andonova (2006) reports some preliminary results in a set-up similar to ours, however, she recognizes that 
the cross-sectional nature of her study puts a serious limitation on their generizability.  
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results a lot more accurate than those of most country-level studies that deal with institutional 
proxies.  
 
The success of cellular telephony in countries with low political constraints (high political risks) 
shows that technological adoption and subsequent economic growth is possible when technologies 
suit the developing country’s institutional environment. The implication is that investors in 
transition and developing countries should promote cheap, mobile, modular versions of existing 
technologies, thus taking advantage of otherwise attractive market conditions and greatly reducing 
their exposure to hold-up by opportunistic host governments. Where political institutions have a 
limited impact, such proactive investor behavior is justified because waiting for complex 
institutional reforms to take place prevents both entrepreneurs from taking profitable business 
opportunities and developing countries from benefiting from growth prospects.  
 
The research reported here is not free from shortcomings. First, we do not disentangle the political 
constraints variable to explain the way in which institutional importance may be reduced. Second, 
we do not deal with telecommunications service quality. Third, despite its relative success 
compared to similar studies on telecommunications, the model leaves a lot of variance unexplained. 
This is because many of the relevant variables are not available for such a large-scale estimation. 
Finally, we expect that similar results hold true for other industries with large potential hold-up 
exposure, although readily available data on technology alternatives and how they compare with 
regard to asset specificity make this kind of research more difficult to perform. We plan to improve 
in all of these directions in future research. 
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Annexe 
 
 
Table 1: Average values of POLCON for 183 countries for 1990-2004 
Country Mean Country Mean Country Mean Country Mean
Afghanistan 0.00 Djibouti 0.00 Liberia 0.00 San Marino 0.19
Albania 0.29 Dominica 0.41 Libya 0.00 Sao Tome & P. 0.00
Algeria 0.20 Dominican Rep. 0.40 Liechtenstein 0.36 Saudi Arabia 0.00
Andorra 0.34 Ecuador 0.25 Lithuania 0.45 Senegal 0.22
Angola 0.27 Egypt 0.25 Luxembourg 0.52 Seychelles 0.00
Antigua & Barbuda 0.27 El Salvador 0.38 Madagascar 0.41 Sierra Leone 0.05
Argentina 0.46 Equatorial Guinea 0.01 Malawi 0.28 Singapore 0.03
Armenia 0.20 Eritrea 0.00 Malaysia 0.53 Slovak Republic 0.52
Australia 0.51 Estonia 0.50 Maldives 0.00 Slovenia 0.56
Austria 0.46 Ethiopia 0.19 Mali 0.24 Solomon Islands 0.46
Azerbaijan 0.00 Fiji 0.32 Malta 0.34 Somalia 0.00
Bahrain 0.00 Finland 0.54 Marshall Islands 0.00 South Africa 0.33
Bangladesh 0.37 France 0.41 Mauritania 0.14 Spain 0.48
Barbados 0.19 Gabon 0.00 Mauritius 0.35 Sri Lanka 0.30
Belarus 0.00 Gambia 0.05 Mexico 0.35 St. Vincent & G. 0.21
Belgium 0.71 Georgia 0.39 Moldova 0.29 Sudan 0.01
Belize 0.27 Germany 0.46 Mongolia 0.19 Suriname 0.00
Benin 0.47 Ghana 0.20 Morocco 0.42 Swaziland 0.00
Bhutan 0.00 Greece 0.37 Mozambique 0.23 Sweden 0.49
Bolivia 0.48 Grenada 0.30 Myanmar 0.00 Switzerland 0.63
Bosnia and Herz. 0.00 Guatemala 0.29 Namibia 0.33 Syria 0.05
Botswana 0.21 Guinea-Bissau 0.20 Nauru 0.00 TFYR Macedonia 0.47
Brazil 0.67 Guinea 0.22 Nepal 0.28 Taiwan. China 0.26
Brunei Darussalam 0.00 Guyana 0.31 Netherlands 0.47 Tajikistan 0.26
Bulgaria 0.40 Haiti 0.21 New Zealand 0.41 Tanzania 0.28
Burkina Faso 0.08 Honduras 0.34 Nicaragua 0.37 Thailand 0.51
Burundi 0.00 Hong Kong 0.00 Niger 0.23 Togo 0.00
Cambodia 0.26 Hungary 0.42 Nigeria 0.15 Trinidad & Tob. 0.42
Cameroon 0.00 Iceland 0.50 Norway 0.52 Tunisia 0.02
Canada 0.46 India 0.47 Oman 0.00 Turkey 0.38
Cape Verde 0.27 Indonesia 0.17 Pakistan 0.29 Turkmenistan 0.00
C. African Rep. 0.33 Iran (Islam. Rep. of) 0.15 Palau 0.00 Uganda 0.13
Colombia 0.39 Iraq 0.00 Panama 0.49 Ukraine 0.41
Comoros 0.16 Ireland 0.45 Papua N. Guinea 0.60 U. Arab Emirates 0.00
Congo 0.07 Israel 0.55 Paraguay 0.44 United Kingdom 0.36
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 0.07 Italy 0.42 Peru 0.43 United States 0.40
Costa Rica 0.36 Jamaica 0.33 Philippines 0.40 Uruguay 0.42
Cote d'Ivoire 0.11 Japan 0.56 Poland 0.36 Uzbekistan 0.00
19
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Croatia 0.36 Jordan 0.37 Portugal 0.40 Vanuatu 0.40
Cuba 0.00 Kazakhstan 0.00 Qatar 0.00 Venezuela 0.36
Cyprus 0.40 Kenya 0.35 Romania 0.48 Viet Nam 0.04
Czech Republic 0.49 Korea (Rep. of) 0.43 Russia 0.11 Yemen 0.00
Chad 0.00 Kuwait 0.48 Rwanda 0.03 Yugoslavia 0.05
Chile 0.50 Kyrgyzstan 0.15 Saint Kitts & N. 0.40 Zambia 0.12
China 0.00 Lao P.D.R. 0.01 Saint Lucia 0.24 Zimbabwe 0.19
Denmark 0.52 Latvia 0.05 Samoa 0.44   
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
 Log(ML) Log(IH) Log(CPS) Log(GDP) POLCON (TI/GDP) 
*100 
Log(IU) Log(WL) Log 
(Price CPS)
Log 
(Price ML) 
Δ levels Δ levels Δ Levels Δ levels levels levels levels levels levels levels 
Mean 0.054 1.937 0.113 -3.417 0.526 0.694 -0.113 3.007 0.345 1.601 -0.075 -0.681 -5.202 -7.620 
S.D. 0.107 1.809 0.598 3.487 0.498 2.625 0.598 1.993 0.203 14.916 2.717 1.799 1.182 1.219 
Correlations               
Log(ML)               
Levels -0.120   
Log(IH)    
Δ 0.105 0.129  
Levels -0.248 0.740 0.007  
Log(CPS)    
Δ 0.186 -0.066 -0.028 -0189  
Levels -2.242 0.609 -0.214 0.764 -0.169  
Log(GDP)    
Δ -0.018 0.059 0.024 0.041 0.045 -0.010  
Levels -0.102 0.812 0.198 0.569 -0.108 0.419 0.034  
POLCON 0.026 0.312 0.119 0.349 0.090 0.204 0.021 0.354  
(TI/GDP)*100 0.111 0.077 -0.019 0.183 0.062 0.211 -0.111 -0.036 -0.020  
Log(IU) -0.279 0.563 -0.278 0.778 -0.168 0.868 0.021 0.314 0.169 0.280  
Log(WL) 0.295 0.092 0.106 -0.131 0.174 -0.132 -0.007 -0.149 -0.164 0.113 -0.074  
Log(Price CPS) -0.038 0.243 0.206 0.155 0.132 -0.047 0.146 0.551 0.222 -0.393 -0.093 -0.186  
Log(Price ML) -0.158 0.133 0.065 0.206 -0.062 0.076 0.112 0.447 0.258 0.024 0.025 -0.385 0.5739  
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Note: Variables are ML (main lines), IH (Internet hosts), CPS (cellular phone subscribers), TI (telecommunications investment), POLCON 
(political constraints), GDP (gross domestic product), IU (Internet users), WL (waiting list for main lines), Price CPS (price of a 3-minute 
cellular local call) and Price ML and IH (price of a 3-minute fixed-line local call) 
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Table 3: Estimates of the ICT penetration level, endogenous variable is Δyt 
 Main lines (ML)  Cellular (CPS)  Internet hosts (IH)  Main lines (ML)  Internet hosts 
(IH) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
Constant  0.0522
(1.1)
-0.6410
(-41.9)
0.2628
(0.7)
-1.0613
(-7.2)
-0.8891
(-1.4)
-4.2604
(-27.4)
0.0280
(0.5)
-0.7292
(-36.7)
-0.7148
(-1.1)
-
4.8709 
(-23.3) 
yt-1 -0.0508
(-4.9)
-0.1134
(-36.1)
-0.2191
(-6.9)
-0.3621
(-18.8)
-0.5611
(-18.5)
-0.5224
(-31.3)
-0.0997
(-6.1)
-0.1357
(-44.1)
-0.5170
(-14.1)
-
0.6918 
(-32.4) 
log(GDP)t-1 0.0070
(1.5)
0.1050
(38.2)
-0.0797
(-1.8)
0.4031
(28.5)
-0.0269
(-0.4)
0.6698
(27.9)
0.0168
(2.7)
0.1385
(35.4)
-0.0419
(-0.6)
0.5428 
(20.3) 
Δlog(GDP)t 0.0083
(1.5)
0.1717
(53.2)
-0.0121
(-0.3)
0.3011
(11.2)
0.0096
(0.1)
0.4721
(15.6)
0.0062
(1.1)
0.0709
(24.4)
-0.0067
(-0.1)
0.4889 
(12.6) 
POLCONt-1 0.0545
(2.7)
0.3424
(25.7)
-0.0253
(-0.1)
0.2017
(2.6)
-0.2384
(-0.6)
1.7303
(6.4)
0.0509
(1.7)
0.3246
(20.4)
-0.0101
(0.0)
2.8147 
(10.2) 
yt-1·POLCONt-1 -0.0182
(-1.8)
-0.0694
(-12.8)
-0.1160
(-1.9)
-0.1857
(- 4.1)
0.0063
(0.1)
0.0757
(1.3)
-0.0177
(-1.2)
-0.0672
(-9.1)
0.0382
(0.6)
0.3774 
(7.3) 
(TI/GDP)t-1 
 
0.0141
(4.6)
0.0540
(29.5)
0.0242
(0.7)
0.1897
(14.0)
-0.0743
(-1.8)
0.1229
(3.6)
0.0224
(5.1)
0.0547
(22.5)
-0.0741
(-1.6)
0.1051 
(3.9) 
Pricet -0.0087
(-2.2)
-0.0634
(-39.6)
0.0536
(1.6)
-0.1392
(-8.2)
-0.0244
(-0.4)
-0.0903
(-2.2)
-0.0094
(-2.0)
-0.0620
(-42.8)
-0.0216
(-0.4)
-
0.1045 
(-4.4) 
log(WL)t-1   0.0202
(5.7)
0.0276
(25.5)
 
Δlog(WL)t   0.0033
(0.5)
0.0062
(0.6)
 
log(IU)t-1   -0.0548
(-1.5)
0.1677 
(7.8) 
ρ 0.6535 0.7485 0.9009 0.8589 0.9009  
Test ui=0 (F stat.) 4.36* 2.24* 4.71 3.55 4.71  
Sargan test (χ2 stat.) 113.3 88.03 86.98 88.02 91.22 
Test AR(1)  (z stat.) -1.77 -3.67 -4.13 -2.36 -3.52 
Test AR(2)  (z stat.) 1.13 -1.47 -0.39 -0.38 -0.16 
Sample size 1,294 1,234  697 616  828 907 855 806 862 818 23
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Notes:  
(1) All models include dummy years; yt is the logarithm of ML, CPS and IH per 100 inhabitants; GMM is the variant of the 
Arellano and Bond’s estimator; FE is the linear panel data model with fixed effects estimator; standardized normal ratios in 
parenthesis.             
 
(2) Variables are, TI (telecommunications investment), POLCON (political constraints), GDP  (gross domestic product), IU 
(Internet users), WL (waiting list for main lines), Price CPS (price of a 3-minute cellular local call) and Price ML and IH (price of a 
3-minute fix-line local call) 
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